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TEPartners
(Leviathan), Microsoft (Palladium -- see
#1 footnote below), and the Trusted Computing Platform
Alliance (TPS -- see #2 footnote below)
have all recognized that a trusted computing environment can only
be established with a proper combination of hardware and software.
This white paper summarizes the differences.
The information discussed in this white paper is summarized in
the table below. This information is presented to make all readers
aware that they can get the ultimate in computer security while
expending the least amount of money, effort and time by installing
the Leviathan Module and its accompanying Access Control Software
to protect their computer system hardware, the software installed
on it and the data that is stored in its memories.
1. Palladium
Systems: Microsoft, Inc. defines the Palladium system in terms
of two components. A hardware component called the "Security
Support Component" and a software component called the "nexus."
Microsoft defines these two components as follows:
- The Security
Support Component (SSC) is a hardware module (also called a
chip elsewhere in the Palladium documentation) that can perform
certain cryptographic operations and securely store one or more
cryptographic keys that are used by Palladium to provide the
sealed storage and attestation functions. At a minimum, the
SSC provides RSA public-key operations (encryption, decryption,
digital signature generation and verification), AES encryption
and decryption, and SHA-1 hash computation. The SSC also contains
at least one RSA private key and AES symmetric key that are
private to the SSC and never exported from the chip.
- A nexus,
what Microsoft used to refer to as a "nub" or "trusted
operating root," is essentially the kernel of the Palladium-isolated
software stack. Palladium services are initialized by booting
the Palladium hardware with a mini operating system kernel called
the nexus. The nexus provides a limited set of APIs and services
for Palladium applications including sealed storage and attestation
functions. Think of Palladium applications and a Palladium nexus
as residing in the user mode and kernel mode spaces of the parallel
Palladium execution environment. (Microsoft states: "Anyone
can write a nexus for a Palladium, but the user always has authority
over what nexuses are allowed to run on top of the Palladium
hardware."
| |
Leviathan
|
Palladium
|
TCPA
|
|
General
Characteristics
|
|
Next-Generation
Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) |
Trusted
Computing Platform Alliance |
|
Supplier
|
TEPartners
|
Microsoft
|
IBM,
AMD, ATMEL, National, WAVESystems
|
|
CPU
changes
|
NONE
|
YES
(new register)
|
NONE
|
|
Motherboard
changes
|
NONE
|
YES
|
YES
|
|
Operating
System changes
|
NONE
|
Requires
new Nezus
|
NONE
|
|
Seperated
Address Space
|
YES
(multiple)
|
Partial
|
Partial
|
|
Secure
Boot Process
|
YES
|
Later
feature, when "SSC" is built into the CPU
|
YES
|
|
Boot
ROM
|
No
changes
|
No
changes
|
Re-located
to Low Pin Count (LPC) bus; also requires new boot ROM
I.C.
|
|
| Hardware |
Leviathan |
Security
Support Component |
Security
Processor - Trusted Platform Module (TPM) |
|
Hardware
Interface
|
Physically
"sandwiched" between CPU and Motherboard's North
Bridge |
On
Processor Bus - in parallel with BIOS ROM, Basic RAM, and
South Bridge (LPC) |
On
Low Pin Count (LPC) Low Speed |
| Crypto
Engines |
Any
DoD or Commercial crypto engine (any version) |
Commercial
(Microsoft version) only |
Commercial
(Supplier version) only |
| Hidden
Secure Storage |
|
|
|
Secured
Data Path for User I&A
|
YES |
NO |
NO |
Secure
Digest File
|
YES |
NO |
NO |
|
| Access
Control Software |
Full
Control |
Secure
I/O only |
Secure
I/O only |
| Resident
Data Protection (RDP) |
YES |
Unknown |
NO |
| User
I&A |
YES
(can include biometrics) |
Limited |
Limited |
| Secure
Data Transfer |
YES |
YES |
YES |
| Remote
Site I&A |
YES
(for user terminal) |
YES |
YES |
|
| Common
Criteria |
|
|
|
| Evaluatable |
YES |
YES |
YES |
| Non
Bypassable |
YES |
NO |
NO |
| Always
Involved |
YES |
NO |
NO |
| Tamper
Proof |
YES |
NO |
NO |
| Controlled
Information Flow |
YES |
YES |
YES |
| (Target)
Evaluated Assurance Level |
? |
1
to 3 |
1
to 3 |
|
| Applications |
|
|
|
| Commercia |
YES |
YES |
YES |
| U.S.
Government |
|
|
|
COTS
hardware
|
Present
and future COTS |
Future
COTS? |
Future
COTS? |
Secure
OS required
|
NO
(works with any OS) |
YES |
YES |
User-specific
sealed storage
|
YES |
YES |
YES |
Trusted
Operator sealed storage
|
YES |
NO |
NO |
Theft
Protection Lock (Owner I&A)
|
YES |
NO |
NO |
DoD
(MLS) applications
|
YES |
NO |
NO |
2. Trusted
Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) Subsystems: The TCPA defines
the heart of their Trusted Platform Subsystem as a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) that may or may not be a physical module. (However,
all present implementations of the TPM, those from AMD, Atmel
(which is used by IBM), National Semiconductor and Wavexpress,
Inc., have a hardware chip as their cores.) Microsoft defines
the differences between the Palladium and the TCPA specification
as follows:
"The key difference between the two models is the relationship
between the security co-processor - the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) in TCPA and the SSC in Palladium - and the rest of the PC.
In the TCPA model, the TPM is a mandatory part of the boot sequence
on a TCPA-certified platform. A TCPA TPM is able to measure (make
signed statements about) the entire set of software that is running
on a PC. In contrast Palladium is designed to sit side by side
with the PC's operating system and does not need to be involved
with the boot process of the machine. The use of security features
provided by the Palladium, including all functions involving the
SSC, is always optional and under the user's control."
So far all versions of the TPM and the stated implementation of
the SSC are single chip, RISC-based microprocessors with an embedded
cryptographic arithmetic unit. All TPMs have, so far, been built
to be low cost and to be connected to the PC via the Low Pin Count
(LPC) bus. All of these, in order to comply with the TCPA requirement
for a Trusted System to have a "secure boot process,"
have relocated the boot ROM from being connected to the CPU via
the microprocessor's bus to being on the other side of the TPM
from the LPC bus. Microsoft has defined the SSC as being (initially)
connected to the microprocessor via the microprocessor's bus and
has removed the requirement of having a "secure boot process"
from the functions to be performed by the SSC. (Microsoft has
stated that they envision that, eventually, the SSC would be integrated
with the microprocessor by being implemented on to the microprocessor's
chip. Such a move of the Palladium hardware would then allow the
Palladium to perform a "secure boot process" as required
by the TCPA specification.)
Both the TPM and the SSC have a hidden secure storage area in
order to hold and keep private critical components such as cryptographic
keys and User Certificates, a user's private information.
There are some TPM chips available today but only one manufacturer,
Atmel, has had any success in making any sales; it's AT97SC3201
IC is a part of the high-end IBM laptop machines. Microsoft has
stated that it will be "several years" before Palladium
appears on any machine.
It should be noted that both the TPM and the SSC require new motherboard
designs and, according to some Microsoft released information,
Palladium will require a new register inside the CPU.
3. Leviathan Systems: Leviathan, on the other hand, already
combines the ability to perform all functions required by the
TCPA specification and by the Palladium system. Leviathan begins
it's operations with the ability to perform a "secure boot
operation" (at the user's option) and provides hidden secure
storage areas for it's security functions. (Leviathan was conceived
in 1994 and the first model completed in 1996. The US and foreign
Patents and applications for patents were filed in 1998, the year
both the TCPA and the Palladium were conceived. The "hidden
secure storage area" for use in security operations is an
allowed claimed feature of the four Leviathan US patents.)
The Leviathan module, since it resides between the microprocessor
and the microprocessor's bus has the ability to run the Palladium
nexus as it is envisioned by Microsoft for the initial implementation
of the SSC and it has the ability to run whatever nexus Microsoft
will define for the next generation Palladium.
Finally, in all of the TCPA and Palladium documents their specifications
cover only PCs as the host. With Leviathan the module can be customized
to the CPU microprocessor's design and provide all of these great
security features for any computer system type regardless of who
is the manufacturer. In no case will the Leviathan module require
a new motherboard but can be retrofitted into existing systems
and onto existing motherboards.
1 -- Also called
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB)
2 -- Trusted Platform Subsystem of which the TPM, Trusted Platform
Module, is a component. See the TCPA Trusted Platform Subsystem
Specification at www.trustedcomputing.org/home.
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